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Intuition and insight are intriguing phenomena of non-analytical mental functioning:
whereas intuition denotes ideas that have been reached by sensing the solution
without any explicit representation of it, insight has been understood as the sudden
and unexpected apprehension of the solution by recombining the single elements of
a problem. By face validity, the two processes appear similar; according to a lay
perspective, it is assumed that intuition precedes insight. Yet, predominant scientific
conceptualizations of intuition and insight consider the two processes to differ with
regard to their (dis-)continuous unfolding. That is, intuition has been understood as
an experience-based and gradual process, whereas insight is regarded as a genuinely
discontinuous phenomenon. Unfortunately, both processes have been investigated
differently and without much reference to each other. In this contribution, we therefore
set out to fill this lacuna by examining the conceptualizations of the assumed underlying
cognitive processes of both phenomena, and by also referring to the research traditions
and paradigms of the respective field. Based on early work put forward by Bowers et al.
(1990, 1995), we referred to semantic coherence tasks consisting of convergent word
triads (i.e., the solution has the same meaning to all three clue words) and/or divergent
word triads (i.e., the solution means something different with respect to each clue word)
as an excellent kind of paradigm that may be used in the future to disentangle intuition
and insight experimentally. By scrutinizing the underlying mechanisms of intuition and
insight, with this theoretical contribution, we hope to launch lacking but needed
experimental studies and to initiate scientific cooperation between the research fields
of intuition and insight that are currently still separated from each other.
Keywords: intuitive decision making, insight problem solving, continuity, discontinuity, non-analytical solution
processes
INTRODUCTION
There are situations, in which decision makers arrive at an idea or a decision not by analytically
inferring the solution but by either sensing the correct solution without being able to give reasons
for it, or by realizing the solution all of a sudden without being able to report on the solution
process. Roughly, the former phenomenon has been called intuition, the latter insight. Both have
fascinated the public as well as the scientific audience.
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Here are two historical cases that illustrate the two phenomena
(Gladwell, 2005; Mclean, as cited in Klein and Jarosz, 2011):
The first is known as the Getty kouros and happened to the
J. Paul Getty Museum in Los Angeles at the end of the 20th
century. The museum was offered to add an over-life-sized statue
in form of a kouros – allegedly from Ancient Greece, and
thus several millions worth – to its art collection. Before the
contract could be concluded, several experts set out to assure the
authenticity of the statue and its origin thereby using a substantial
number of high-tech methods for their analyses. After a year
of thorough inspection, the experts reached the conclusion that
the statue was authentic. At the same time, the former curator
of the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, by chance,
cast a glance at the artwork and spontaneously raised doubts
regarding its authenticity. Thereupon, other men of renown who
were asked for their spontaneous assessment of the kouros, also
reported that they felt that something was wrong with it – without
being able to tell the reason for this impression (cf. Gladwell,
2005). Interestingly, up to now, it could not be entirely cleared
whether the statue stems from Ancient Greece or whether it is a
modern forgery. Yet, the curator – instantaneously “feeling” that
something was wrong and acting upon this impression although
not being able to name a specific reason – is a paramount example
of what it means to have an intuition being strong enough to act
accordingly.
For an example of a sudden insight into the solution of a
complex problem, consider Wagner Dodge, a smokejumper who
survived the Mann Gulch Fire in August 1949 (Mclean, as cited
in Klein and Jarosz, 2011). On a very hot day, a fire broke
out in Mann Gulch, a canyon near Helena in Montana. Sixteen
smokejumpers were flown close to the fire in order to extinguish
it. After they had parachuted out of the aircraft, they realized
that the fire was much worse than expected: They faced an
uncontrollable blaze. The biggest problem was that they were in
the danger of being entrapped by the fire. They could not escape
and thus their lives were immediately threatened. For a moment
they were desperately helpless and bustled around without a plan.
They faced an impasse: well-known routines would not bring
them forward and they might be caught in a mental set, that is, the
tendency to try to solve a problem based on previous successful
solution attempts to similar kinds of problems that are inefficient
or cannot be transferred to the problem at hand (see Luchins and
Luchins, 1959, as well as Öllinger et al., 2008). After a while, all
at once, Wagner Dodge had the sudden idea to ignite an “escape
fire” ahead of the group (i.e., he had a sudden aha-experience).
Although he had never heard of such a possibility, he abruptly
realized that when he could quickly stub an area of vegetation, the
blaze would have no basis to continue when arriving at the cinder.
He put his idea into action, ignited an additional fire and stepped
into the middle of the newly burnt area. This way, he could save
his life; the other smokejumpers who did not trust him lost their
lives in the fire. Today, escape fires belong to the standard practice
of fire services in the wild (Mclean, as cited in Klein and Jarosz,
2011).
Based on these examples, both phenomena – intuition
and insight – may be conceived of as non-analytical thought
processes that result in certain behavior that is not based on
an exclusively deliberate and stepwise search for a solution.
Non-analytical thought means a thought process in which no
deliberate deduction takes place: individuals are not engaged in
the consecutive testing of the obvious and/or typical routes to
solution that define deliberate analysis. Instead, intuitions are
characterized by the decision maker feeling out the solution
without an available, tangible explanation for it; insights are
characterized by the fact that the solution suddenly and
unexpectedly pops into the mind of the decision maker or
problem solver being instantaneously self-evident. Despite these
apparent similarities of the two phenomena, intuition and
insight have been conceptualized rather differently in the
scientific literature up to now with regard to the underlying
cognitive mechanisms as well as to the experimental designs
routinely being used to gain empirical evidence. The aim of
our contribution is therefore to scrutinize the similarities and
differences of the cognitive mechanisms underlying intuition
and insight by drawing on and extending early ideas by
Bowers et al. (1990, 1995). The gripping question is whether
intuition and insight are two qualitatively distinct phenomena,
appearing similar only by face validity, or whether they are
indeed similar/related and may only unfold on different levels
of processing. To address this question, we draw on the latest
contributions in the field and include recent research findings
that have not been available in Bowers et al. (1990, 1995) time.
First, we will give an overview of predominant definitions of
intuition and insight from a cognitive-psychological perspective.
Second, we will elaborate on the underlying cognitive processes
of both phenomena, thereby aiming to pin down similarities and
differences. Both, similarities and differences will be addressed
against the background of the research history of intuition
and insight as well as in light of predominant, experimental
paradigms that have been used to investigate the two phenomena.
The paper ends by outlining open questions and highlighting
future directions in scientific research that may progress our
understanding of the underlying cognitive processes of intuition
and insight (as well as on their relatedness).
DEFINING INTUITION AND INSIGHT
Theoretical Characterization of Intuition
Although most people “intuitively” know what an intuition is,
the scientific community is split over its definition as well as
its conceptualization. Despite disagreement about any definition,
common ground is that intuition is an experienced-based process
resulting in a spontaneous tendency toward a hunch or a
hypothesis (Bowers et al., 1990; Volz and Zander, 2014). Taking
all major definitions into consideration, it is possible to distil
certain characteristics that prominent definitions of intuition
have in common (Glöckner and Witteman, 2010; Volz and
Zander, 2014).
Firstly, there is the aspect of non-conscious processing, which
means that intuition occurs with very little awareness about
the underlying cognitive processes so that people are mostly
not able to report on these. Yet, intuitive processes can partly
or completely be made conscious at some point in the entire
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judgmental process (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2008). In this regard,
intuitive processing is not directly conscious or non-conscious,
but can be viewed as reflecting cognitive processing on the fringe
of human consciousness (Mangan, 1993, 2001, 2015; Norman,
2002, 2016; Price, 2002; Norman et al., 2006, 2010). Secondly,
there is the aspect of automaticity or uncontrollability. Intuitive
processing appears in the form of spontaneous and instantaneous
ideas or hunches that cannot be intentionally controlled in the
way that they cannot be neither intentionally evoked nor ignored
(e.g., Topolinski and Strack, 2008). The unintentional nature of
intuition implies that intuition comes along without attentional
effort and thus intuitive processing has been described as fast
and effortless (e.g., Hogarth, 2001). Thirdly, there is the aspect of
experientiality. Intuitive processing is based on tacit knowledge
that has been acquired without attention during a person’s life
and is thus fueled by it (e.g., Bowers et al., 1990). In combination
these aspects result in the subjective experience of “knowing
without knowing why” as Claxton (1998, p. 217) put it. Lastly,
there is the aspect of the initiation of action. The non-conscious,
experience-based, and unintentional process finally results in a
strong tendency toward a hunch, which serves as a go-signal
that is strong enough to initiate action. As a result, people act
in accordance with their intuitive impression or feeling (e.g.,
Gigerenzer, 2008). For a more detailed overview of the different
aspects, consult Glöckner and Witteman (2010) or Volz and
Zander (2014).
In line with these aspects, Gigerenzer (2008) has focused,
inter alia, on the experiential basis of intuition and states that
intuition may hardly be possible without pre-existing knowledge
and experiences. To revert to the example of the Getty kouros,
the interplay of the given (visible) information was dissonant
for someone who had seen lots of antique statues before; a
beginner to the field may have arrived at a completely different
judgment. By intuitively apprehending the situation, the curator
relied on specific long-term-memory content that had been
primarily acquired by studying, analyzing, and reflecting about
a great number of statues resulting in associative and unattended
learning. Volz and Zander (2014) refer to this kind of memory
content as tacitly (in)formed cue-criterion relationships. On this
view, different environmental cues can have different predictive
power with respect to the criterion at hand; the situational validity
of the cues will moderate whether the cue is used outright. In the
above example, the curator judged the grade of authenticity of the
kouros (criterion) from the subjective impression that the statue’s
outer appearance had on him (cue). By doing this, the curator
could not only rely on the given information (i.e., the visible
kouros), but had to non-consciously activate further relevant
knowledge from memory, that is to activate associatively learned
cue-criterion relationships. Thus, the mental representation
constructed during intuitive processing goes beyond the existing,
perceivable information. Consequently, the curator’s feeling of
unease when having a look at the statue resulted from an
incomplete cue-criterion relationship that was taken as diagnostic
for the assessment of the statue’s authenticity.
In addition to the aspect of experientiality and the
unconscious read-out of implicitly learned cue-criterion
relationships, Gigerenzer (2008) describes intuition as felt
knowledge that aids decision making not only in cases, in
which the decision maker already has a huge amount of prior
experiences with a particular situation, but also when time
and cognitive capacity is limited. According to the author,
shadowy situations – either caused by a blurry sensory input
that is only hardly detectable, or by the temporary non-
availability of necessary information about the individual
decisional components, which does not allow for foreseeing all
consequences of a decision – foster intuitive processing. Intuition
then manifests itself in the use of certain heuristics that may
form highly successful, cognitive shortcuts (Gigerenzer, 2008;
Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011).
Insight and Aha-Experience
In contrast to the above elaborations on intuition, the term
insight has been used to refer to the sudden and unexpected
understanding of a previously incomprehensible problem or
concept. In this sense, Jung-Beeman et al. (2004, p. 506)
explicate the nature of insight as “the recognition of new
connections across existing knowledge.” Sometimes the solution
to a difficult problem may suddenly pop out in the mind
and the decision maker or problem solver may immediately
recognize the complex nexuses, as formerly illustrated in the
episode of the smokejumper Wagner Dodge. Problems seem to
be processed and solved by re-grouping or re-combining (i.e.,
re-structuring) existing information in a new way so that self-
imposed constraints can elegantly be relaxed (Duncker, 1935;
Wertheimer, 1959; Ohlsson, 1992). Wagner Dodge had prior
knowledge: For instance, he knew how fires most commonly can
be extinguished and that fires need vegetation or some other
foundation to burn on. Furthermore, he knew about terrestrial
conditions, and most important, he knew that smoke and fire
could kill him. The solution to the problem occurred when he
non-consciously combined all pieces of knowledge with each
other in a new way so as to circumvent the fire death.
Such insightful solutions are associated with a privileged
storage in long-term memory. Likewise as single trial learning.
Recent studies observed a memory advantage for items that were
solved by insight compared with non-insight solutions (Danek
et al., 2013) as well as compared with items that were not self-
generated (Kizilirmak et al., 2015). So, it is very likely, that
Wagner Dodge never forgot how to ignite escape fires in the wild.
Yet, it has to be emphasized that an exact definition of the
term insight has proven to be difficult, not least because the
term insight has been used in many different ways in problem-
solving research. Another hindrance is that it is very difficult to
empirically operationalize the psychological construct of insight
(Knoblich and Öllinger, 2006), which is a similar problem as
in research on intuition. Hitherto, researchers disagree whether
there are certain necessary and/or sufficient conditions to
determine whether an insight has occurred. For example, due
to the absence of objective physiological markers indicating
the occurrence of an insight, mainly reports in form of the
subjective aha-experience have been used ex post to determine
whether an insight has occurred during the solution process
of a certain problem (e.g., Gick and Lockhardt, 1995; Bowden
et al., 2005; Danek et al., 2013). Danek et al. (2013, p. 2) state
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that the aha-experience is “the clearest defining characteristic of
insight problem solving.” Topolinski and Reber (2010) define
the aha-experience as the sudden and unexpected understanding
of the solution, which comes with ease and is accompanied by
positive affect as well as confidence in the truth of the solution.
Given scientific endeavors to (objectively) pin down whether an
insight had occurred, it can be summarized that insight and
aha-experience have been equated. However, to date, there is
disagreement whether (a) every insight is accompanied by an
aha-experience, and (b) aha-experiences can only accompany
insights and do never occur for presented solutions (i.e., solutions
that are not generated by the individual herself; cf. Klein and
Jarosz, 2011; Kizilirmak et al., 2015).
In order to help clarifying the conceptual muddle on
insight, Knoblich and Öllinger (2006) proposed a classification
of insight on three dimensions: first, on a phenomenological
dimension, insight is opposed to a systematic and stepwise
solution approach. Instead, it can be described as the sudden,
unintended, and unexpected appearance of a solution idea, which
is accompanied by a strong emotional component – the subjective
and involuntary aha-experience. Second, on a task dimension,
the literature on insight distinguishes between predefined insight
problems and non-insight problems, with insight problems
requiring sudden solution ideas and non-insight problems
requiring a rather incremental solution approach. In case such
an insight problem is solved, it is inferred that it is very
likely that an insight has taken place. For example, the nine-
dot problem (Maier, 1930), the eight-coin problem (Ormerod
et al., 2002), and the candle problem (Duncker, 1935) belong
to such classical insight problems. However, a disadvantage
of this distinction is that there are no unique criteria for an
insight problem, and most of these problem could be solved
with or without having an insight (Öllinger et al., 2014); the
most proposed criteria refer back to the subjective experience
of aha, which has led to a circular definition of insight and
insight problems. To circumvent this disadvantage, Bowden et al.
(2005) have suggested using a class of problems that can be
solved either with insight or without insight. Last, on a process
dimension, recent research is concerned with the underlying
cognitive mechanisms of insight and how these are different
from non-insight problem solving. The predominant assumption
here is that the non-conscious cognitive process of a mental set
shift enables a changed representation of the problem’s elements
(Ohlsson, 1992, 2011), which in turn leads to a sudden insight
into the solution. For instance, in the nine-dot problem, the
sudden realization that moves beyond the virtual nine-dot square
are possible may lead to the relaxation of the perceptually driven
boundary constraints and thus to a representational change of
the problem space, which in the following enable insightful
solutions (for a detailed explanation of the three dimensions
consult Knoblich and Öllinger, 2006)1.
1There is the idea that a period, in which a person after encountering an impasse
is not being consciously engaged in finding the solution anymore and puts
the problem aside (i.e., the incubation period) fosters sudden insights of the
solution (e.g., Gilhooly et al., 2012). Ritter and Dijksterhuis (2014) explain that
unconscious thought processes continue to find the problem’s solution by re-
organizing memory content eventually resulting in gist-based representations. This
DIFFERENT RESEARCH TRADITIONS OF
INTUITION AND INSIGHT
After having defined both cognitive phenomena, intuition
and insight, it becomes obvious that both share a similarity
in terms of persisting conceptual difficulties. Moreover, with
regard to the subjective phenomenology they reveal a distinct
picture: While intuition means to non-consciously understand
environmental patterns and to act according with this first
impression without being able to justify it (Bowers et al.,
1990), insight problem solving deals with situations in which
a solution pops into a person’s mind out of the blue (Durso
et al., 1994). Yet, both processes can be viewed as non-
analytical solution or thought processes, where no incremental
search takes place. In the following, we will critically elaborate
on the cognitive processes assumed to underlie intuition
and insight. Starting point will be a few words on the
research history of both, which allow to understand why
both fields of research have developed independently over
time.
The Single- vs. Dual-System View on
Intuition
Intuition research has been deeply integrated in research on
judgment and decision making that investigates how humans
decide between alternatives and judge situations (Plessner et al.,
2008). Yet this took some time, in which intuition had been
neglected due to its elusiveness (Betsch, 2008). Now researchers
agree that “intuition need not to be “magical” – it can be
defined and explained scientifically” (Sadler-Smith, 2008, p. 1).
It has to be emphasized, though, that, historically, the concept
of intuition has fallen between (at least) two stools: The fast-
and-frugal-heuristic approach – which sees the concept in a
positive light as it serves as the basis for heuristics and thus is
a valid strategy successfully be used when time and cognitive
capacity is limited in a fuzzy real world (Gigerenzer et al.,
1999) –, and the heuristics-and-biases approach – which conceives
of heuristics based on intuition as a source of erroneous and
biased thinking that demonstrates human cognitive fallibility
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1974). Both approaches have localized
the concept of intuition completely differently within human
thought processes and assign qualitatively different functions to
it. Today, due to their continuing, fundamentally contradictory
assumptions concerning human cognition, the fast-and-frugal-
heuristic approach and the heuristics-and-biases approach
pit themselves against each other. Conceptually, the key
difference may be that Kahneman and Tversky (1974) and
Kahneman (2011) advocate a dual-system view on human
thinking (intuition vs. deliberation), whereas Kruglanski and
Gigerenzer (2011) and Mega et al. (2015) favor a single
system view of unified processes in thinking and reasoning.
occurs in the absence of a person’s conscious attempts. It has to be emphasized,
however, that empirical studies revealed different results as to whether incubation
periods are beneficial for problem solving. The specific conditions under which
positive incubation effects take place have to be further investigated (Sio and
Ormerod, 2009).
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Additionally, it has to be emphasized that, since interest in
intuition has mainly originated from the area of judgment
and decision making, implications for intuition with respect
to problem solving processes (and insight) are rather hard to
derive from this kind of research. This may have complicated
experimentally clarifying the relationship between intuition and
insight.
Intuition As Experienced-Based
Perception of Coherence and As an
Antecedent of Insight
To anticipate elaboration taking place later in this contribution,
we mention a third approach in intuition research, which has
developed independently from any dual- or single perspective
and has its roots in the creativity and problem-solving literature
(Mednick, 1962; Bowers et al., 1995; Dorfman et al., 1996).
Intuition is here conceived as the experience-based perception
or recognition of environmental meaning/coherence in terms of
a sensitization toward the detection of hidden patterns whose
structure cannot be immediately verbalized. For example, in
the different versions of the semantic coherence task originally
developed by Bowers et al. (1990), participants are asked to
judge the semantic coherence of word triads and to name
a forth word that may be the semantic link between the
words, if it exists. Research found out that in these tasks
participants are able to correctly categorize word triads as
semantic coherent or incoherent – intriguingly even when they
are not able to name the forth word, which is a paramount
example of intuitive processing (e.g., Bowers et al., 1990;
Bolte and Goschke, 2005). They rather feel the semantic link
between the three words, but are not (yet) able to report
on the reasons in terms of a solution concept that describes
the semantic associations between the triad’s constituents. The
concept of fringe consciousness (Mangan, 1993, 2001, 2015) may
be helpful to further understand intuition as the preliminary
perception of environmental coherence. Price and Norman
(2008), referring to the concept of fringe consciousness, have
explained that the stream of consciousness does not only
include a nucleus of consciously available information, but
also a non-conscious fringe that contains cognitive signals of
temporarily unavailable, non-conscious information processing
that is constantly going on in the background (as it accompanies
cognition). These signals are continuously going on as cognitive
byproducts of cognitive processes. Yet, they are only consciously
experienced when attention is drawn to them (Reber et al.,
2004). Regarding the semantic coherence task, the product
of this non-conscious processing on the fringe (i.e., the
subjectively experienced intuition) is consciously perceivable,
but its antecedents, direct content, and underlying processing
mechanisms are outside of awareness (see also Topolinski and
Strack, 2009a).
On this view, intuitive responses have been understood
as “intuitive antecedents of insight” (Bowers et al., 1995,
p. 27). As far as we know, this has been the first (and
only) conception that up to now has addressed a potential
link between intuition and insight. Their early work allows
deriving assumptions concerning the interaction of intuition
and insight in more detail. Moreover, this conceptualization
produced valuable empirical paradigms (e.g., semantic and
visual coherence judgment tasks) that are particularly suited to
investigate insight and its intuitive precursors. Therefore, we
will elaborate on this conception later in this contribution when
aiming to clarify the conceptual relationship between intuition
and insight2.
The Special-Process vs. Nothing-Special
View on Insight
In contrast, research on insightful thinking has its roots in
Gestalt psychology, which investigated the integration and
ordering mechanisms of human perception and problem solving
(e.g., Köhler, 1921; Duncker, 1945; Metzger, 1953). Similar to
intuition research, the research on insight problem solving is
also located between two different views: The special-process
view – which posits that insight problem solving involves a
unique cognitive process that is qualitatively different from
the processes non-insight problem solving utilizes – and the
business-as-usual or nothing-special view – which assumes that
mainly the same cognitive processes are involved in insight
and non-insight problem solving (Seifert et al., 1995). Despite
these two views, scientists have been highly fascinated by the
topic since its early description by the Gestalt psychologists.
This great interest culminated in the seminal book “The nature
of insight,” which mainly deals with the Gestalt psychologist’s
view on insight problem solving (Sternberg and Davidson,
1995).
Interim Summary I
In sum, both concepts, due to their elusiveness, had to fight
for recognition as an established field of research. Nevertheless,
regrettably, research on intuition and research on insight has
developed mostly independently from each other. However,
this is in sharp contrast to a lay perspective on the two
phenomena, which would rather endorse the perspective that
intuition and insight are inherently intertwined with intuition
being an antecedent of insight (in terms of a slight previous
impression on the fringe of consciousness). Yet, the two branches
of research evolved from different research traditions using
different scientific paradigms and, unfortunately, have referred
to one another only marginally (i.e., for instance by Bowers
et al., 1990). Therefore, we think it is now time to scrutinize
the relationship between the two phenomena in greater depth.
Based on Bowers et al. (1990, 1995) work, we will do this by
elaborating on the cognitive similarities and differences of the two
phenomena and by offering preliminary process ideas on their
relationship.
2For the sake of completeness, it has to be emphasized that metacognitive processes
may play a role as well in intuitive processing. To strengthen the scope of our
argumentation, we decided not to detail on this notion. Please see Mealor and
Dienes (2013); Storm and Hickman (2015), or Thompson et al. (2011). A particular
emphasize may be laid on the concept of experience-based metacognitive feelings
(e.g., Koriat and Levy-Sadot, 1999).
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DIFFERENCES IN THE COGNITIVE
PROCESSES ASSUMED TO UNDERLIE
INTUITION AND INSIGHT
The Continuity Model of Intuition:
Intuition As a Gradual Process
In the majority of conceptualizations, intuitive processing has
been described within a continuity model locating intuition on
one end of the continuum and insight on the other. A prominent
example is the two-stage model put forward by Bowers et al.
(1990). The authors determine intuition as the preliminary
perception of coherence in the environment triggered by
tacit knowledge that has been acquired unintentionally during
a person’s life (i.e., the cue-criterion relationships that we
addressed earlier in this contribution, see also Volz and Zander,
2014). While tacit, or implicit, knowledge is seen as the
foundation on which intuitions are based (e.g., Lieberman,
2000), in our view, intuition must not be regarded solely
as a phenomenon of or even be equated with implicit
memory processing. As Volz and Zander (2014) clarify,
there are several important differences between intuition
and implicit memory concerning both the format in which
information is stored in memory and the kind of signal that
accompanies the respective cognitive process. The fact that
implicit knowledge is seen only as one component of processing
is similar to the field of implicit cognition in general. Here,
implicit knowledge is assumed to be supplemented and/or
completed by antecedent hunches of correct solution, the
subjectively experienced nearness to the solution (Reber et al.,
2007).
Based on Polanyi’s (1966) concept of tacit knowledge, Bowers
(1984, p. 256) defined intuition as “sensitivity and responsiveness
to information that is not consciously represented, but which
nevertheless guides inquiry toward productive and sometimes
profound insights.” According to the author, the cognitive
processing from an intuitive hunch toward an explicit insight is
gradual and proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, the guiding
or intuitive stage, environmental cues trigger the activation of
tacit knowledge associatively connected in semantic memory,
which results in an implicit perception of coherence that (yet)
cannot be explained verbally. This process is characterized
by the automatic spread of activation proposed by Collins
and Loftus (1975). In the second stage of intuition, the
integrative or insight stage, information becomes consciously
available, which is enabled via a gradual accumulation of the
previously activated concepts. The previous, implicit activation
becomes now explicitly represented, which may thus be also
interpreted as a form of insight processing. Hence, in Bowers
et al. (1990, 1995) conception, intuition precedes insight
in the way that explicit representations are anticipated by
the sensitization of environmental pattern or structure. Yet,
besides the idea of a gradual, successive accumulation of
activated concepts in associative memory, unfortunately, it
has remained unclear which cognitive and/or physiological
conditions foster the transition from sensed intuition to justified
insight.
Bowers et al. (1990) approach is not only theoretically
important it also carries paradigmatic weight. In order to
empirically test their model’s assumptions, the authors developed
several novel paradigms (verbal as well as perceptual ones),
which today, after slight revisions, belong to the standard
paradigms of intuition research (e.g., Bolte and Goschke,
2005; Volz and von Cramon, 2006; Topolinski and Strack,
2009b; Hicks et al., 2010; Remmers et al., 2014; Zander
et al., 2015). One of them is the semantic coherence task
mentioned above, consisting of word triads that can be
either semantically coherent (e.g., SALT, DEEP, and FOAM)
or incoherent (DREAM; BALL; BOOK). Semantic coherence
is determined via a fourth word each word of the word
triad’s constituents associatively hints at (e.g., SEA for the
coherent triad). Participants are instructed to perform a semantic
coherence judgment, that is, to indicate via button press whether
a given triad is coherent or incoherent. Researchers found
that people showed an above-chance discrimination between
coherent and incoherent triads even when they are not able
to name the forth word (e.g., Bowers et al., 1990; Bolte
and Goschke, 2005). In other words, people were intuitively
sensitized to the detection of coherence prior to its explicit
recognition (i.e., before having an explicit insight into the
underlying semantic structure). Using a similar task, which
consists of up to 15 semantically target-related clue words
(i.e., the Accumulated Clues Task), it could be observed that
participants continuously approached the explicit representation
of environmental patterns/meaning (Bowers et al., 1990; Reber
et al., 2007), which could be recently also demonstrated on a
neuronal level when using the semantic coherence task (Zander
et al., 2015). These results are perfectly in line with Bowers
et al. (1990) definition of intuition and the corresponding gradual
two-stage model. As another important aspect concerning
the link between intuition and insight, Bowers et al. (1990)
suggested the concept of semantic convergence to differentiate
between triads that are rather easily solved by non-consciously
reading out the common association (i.e., convergent triads)
and triads that require a reorganization of semantic associations
(i.e., divergent triads; see also the section Bridging the gap
between the underlying processes of insight and intuition, second
part).
To put it in a nutshell, according to the continuity model, –
as Bowers et al. (1990) defined and tested it by means of
verbal and visual coherence tasks – intuition and insight (in
terms of an explicit representation that can be verbalized)
are inherently intertwined: intuition and insight build upon
each other and the one can hardly occur without the other.
That is, intuitive processing is the non-conscious precursor
of insight and thus, intuition and insight build on each
other evolving on different processing stages. Accordingly,
intuition and insight are not considered qualitatively distinct
or mutually exclusive. Instead a crosstalk between the two is
possible and even required to some extent. Importantly, Bowers
et al. (1995) noted, that a thought process that appears to be
sudden on a phenomenological level (like an aha-experience)
nevertheless could have continuous underlying processes that
have led to the particular subjective experience. Thus, they
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do not exclude the existence of subjective aha-experiences
accompanying the successful solution generation in their verbal
tasks.
Along these lines, when investigating insights from a
naturalistic perspective (i.e., in a field setting and not in
controlled laboratory settings), Klein and Jarosz (2011) found
out that a substantial number of insights occurred gradually
and in an (non-conscious) evidence-accumulating fashion.
Following the naturalistic-decision-making approach (Zsambok
and Klein, 1997), the authors aimed at investigating the
natural occurrence of insights by analyzing a collection of
reported insight incidents (comprising a radical shift in
understanding) having occurred in the different domains
of everyday life of different occupation (e.g., invention,
firefighting, management, and the like). The authors found
out that (a) impasses did not occur in each insight case,
(b) not every incident of an insight was accompanied by
an aha-experience, and (c) an intuitive feeling of how
near the solution might be occurred in many cases before
the actual solution was reached. These results indicate that
insights in a naturalistic setting may differ from insights
synthetically induced by the class of pre-defined insight
problems (e.g., eight-coin-problem, Ormerod et al., 2002)
according to the degree with which the solution is derived
gradually. Thus, in the naturalistic setting, a continuous
solution approach (as advocated in intuition research) may be
adoptable.
The Discontinuity Model of Insight:
Insight As the Result of a Mental
Restructuring Process
Contrary to the idea of a gradual solution approach, there
is the discontinuity model of problem solving: insight is
strongly linked to cognitive processes that restructure mental
problem representations in order to allow the generation of
a solution to a complex problem. A prominent example of a
discontinuity model is the representational change theory put
forward by Ohlsson (1992, 2011) that combines the Gestalt
psychological approach (characterized by a person being unable
to report conscious solution strategies, cf. Duncker, 1945) and the
information-processing view on problem solving (characterized
by a conscious search through alternatives in a problem space,
which is a controllable and reportable process, cf. Newell and
Simon, 1972). According to the representational change theory,
and in sharp contrast to the two-stage model developed by
Bowers et al. (1990), prior knowledge and experiences are
postulated to hamper (instead of promote) the generation
of solutions since they easily turn into constraints (Knoblich
et al., 1999). Based on this, Ohlsson (1992) introduced the
idea that an impasse, that is a “blind lane” where one is
caught in wrong solution attempts finding no expedient or
problem solving attempts ceases, is the precondition for a
representational change that results in an insight. According
to the author, a restructuring process is required, during
which self-imposed constraints of the problem representation
change and the problem solver obtains a “fresh look” at
the problem. Problem solvers may then be able to rearrange
either the individual components or the general assumptions
how to solve the problem. A putative mechanism assumed
to drive such restructuring processes is the relaxation of
self-imposed constraints. The representational change theory
became very influential; there are several studies that have
tested and could corroborate its assumptions (e.g., Knoblich
et al., 2001; Kershaw and Ohlsson, 2004; Öllinger et al., 2006,
2013).
In an eye movement study, for example, participants
were asked to transform an incorrect arithmetic statement,
which is made up of Roman numbers made of matchsticks,
into a correct one moving only one single matchstick.
Interestingly, it could be observed that before the correct
solution of difficult problems was generated, suddenly, solvers
attended such problem elements of the equation (e.g., the
operators) longer that they had hardly noticed before. This
was taken as evidence that successful solvers overcame self-
imposed constraints (Knoblich et al., 2001). Research on
the underlying cognition of the representational change
theory could also help in understanding the subjective aha-
experience as a subjective marker of insight: a recent study
conducted by Danek et al. (2016) provides first evidence
that the self-reported rates of aha-experiences depend on
the degree of constraint relaxation that is necessary to
solve the given problem. The authors found that the more
constraints had to be relaxed, the less aha-experiences were
reported, which was interpreted such that the execution of
several necessary solution steps (that are needed to gain a
representational change) minimizes or even eliminates the
experience of suddenness as a key attribute of subjective
aha-experiences.
Interim Summary II
To summarize, according to a discontinuity model, the cognitive
processes of intuition and insight seem to be qualitatively
distinct. No crosstalk between them is possible. Moreover,
the first (intuitive) look on a problem resulting in a mental
impasse biases the subsequent solution. To be more precise,
the intuitive apprehension of a problem necessarily leads
to an impasse and restructuring processes are needed so
as to overcome the bias and to solve the problem. This
can be demonstrated, for example, via the utilization of
magic tricks in order to probe insight problem solving. To
explicate, Danek et al. (2013) recently introduced a novel
paradigm consisting of magic tricks to investigate the cognitive
underpinnings of insight problem solving. When viewing
these magic tricks, the intuitive viewing pattern, which the
magician intentionally utilizes, will very likely prohibit the
understanding of the trick, that is, to first impede the
solution to the problem. The solution is only within reach
when the intuitive apprehension of the magic-trick situation,
that is the first and rapidly formed impression, can be
overcome. Classical insight problems as for example the
famous candle problem (Duncker, 1935) utilize the same
rationale.
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BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN THE
UNDERLYING PROCESSES OF INSIGHT
AND INTUITION
Dual-System Models of Thinking and
Reasoning
This discontinuity approach resembles the experimental
procedure in typical judgment and decision-making studies
conducted within the heuristics-and-biases framework
(Kahneman, 2011). This framework draws on a class of
psychological models that are very well known in social and
cognitive psychology and are called dual-system or dual-process
models (e.g., Evans and Frankish, 2009; Kahneman, 2011).
These models assume two different modes of thinking, which
Stanovich and West (2000) called System 1 (described as
e.g., non-conscious, fast, associative, holistic, automatic, and
emotional) and System 2 (described as e.g., conscious, slow,
analytic, serial, controlled, and affect-free). In other words,
according to dual-system models, judgments may be formed
via two qualitatively distinct processes or systems – an intuitive
one (System 1) or a deliberate one (System 2). The intuitive
strategy, thereby, is thought to require some sort of a feeling that
“tells” a person which option is the optimal one. Thus, affective
feelings are here seen as a crucial component that is inherent
to the entire decision process. In contrast, when thoroughly
deliberating on the pros and cons of multiple options, the
solution to the decision process is considered to come to mind
by way of logic and exhaustively sensible considerations of
probable consequences. Thus, System 2 processing is here
thought to not need or even to not involve any affective
contribution.
Despite the large number of contributions that support
the dual-systems view both theoretically and empirically, such
theories have nevertheless recently come under strong fire
(Keren and Schul, 2009; Kruglanski and Gigerenzer, 2011).
The main point of criticism put forward by Keren and Schul
(2009, p. 534) is that “the different dual-system theories lack
conceptual clarity, that they are based upon methodological
methods that are questionable, and that they rely on insufficient
(and often inadequate) empirical evidence.” Kruglanski and
Gigerenzer (2011) provide a unified approach and explain that
both, intuition and deliberation, rely on the same functional
principles (i.e., they are based on if – then rules), which is
dependent on environmental conditions. As a reply to such
criticism, Evans and Stanovich (2013) recently riposted that it is
overstated since such criticism refers to dual-system models as
a class of purely the same theoretical assumptions. They clarify
that there are indeed different assumptions and terminologies
subsumed under the dual-system framework, which needs to
be considered. Nevertheless, there is also neuronal evidence
against the assumptions of the dual-system approach (Mega
et al., 2015). The authors did a functional-magnetic-resonance-
imaging study and asked participants to judge either intuitively
or deliberately the authenticity of emotional facial expressions.
Interestingly, the authors found that intuition and deliberation
recruit the same neuronal networks – a finding well in line
with Kruglanski and Gigerenzer’s (2011) proposal. It can be
summarized that the dual-system framework is being much
debated at the moment (see also volume 8 of Perspectives
on Psychological Science, 2013) and therefore, it is very likely
that there will be a revised conception in the foreseeable
future.
Dual-System Models and the
Discontinuity Model of Insight: Intuition
As the First and Biased Problem
Representation
After having shortly named the key assumptions of the dual-
system framework as well as potential critical points, we will
continue by elaborating on why we think the experimental
approach of the insight problem solving literature (e.g., Danek
et al., 2013) is similar to the one pursued by the heuristics-
and-biases framework (Kahneman, 2011). A typical task used by
researchers of the heuristics-and-biases approach is the bat and
the ball problem. Participants are told that a bat and ball together
cost $ 1.10 in total and that the bat costs $ 1 more than the ball.
Then they are asked to state how much the ball costs. A vast
number of experiments showed that the first “intuitive answer,”
following Kahneman’s terminology, is 10 cent, but after a while of
conscious deliberation (i.e., analytical thought) participants find
out that the correct answer is 5 cent (Kahneman, 2011). Here
is employed the same principle as in the magic-trick paradigm:
the first and rapidly formed judgment, which is intentionally
induced by the task material, is incorrect and hampers the
generation of the correct solution (here 5 cent). In terms of
the representational change theory an over-constraint problem
representation is activated, where a simple goal representation is
set up: total sum minus bat results immediately in the cost of the
ball. Overcoming these assumptions seems difficult and requires a
more sophisticated goal representation that combines two sets of
information: (1) bat − ball = 1 AND (2) bat + ball = 1.10 => 1
in (2) ball+ ball+ 1= 1.10=> ball= 0.05).
Together, experiments from both scientific fields show that
by exploiting peoples’ intuitive apprehension of a problem, the
solution is precluded from the beginning. To overcome the
impasse or bias, it is suggested that the problem solver may
engage in restructuring the problem space or in analytic strategies
so as to eventually being able to solve the problem and to arrive at
the objectively correct answer. Thus, there might be a reasonable
mapping of the discontinuity model to the common dual-system
model: first, the intuitive system starts (whether by default first
or in parallel to System 2), and will lead to an over-constrained
or biased problem representation that subsequently may lead
to an impasse or conflict. Essential for reaching a solution is,
(i) that the problem solver or decision maker realizes that the
fast initial apprehension of the problem precludes its solution
and (ii) engages in a representational change to overcome the
initial problem representation (Öllinger et al., 2014). Since,
by definition, System 2 processing is slower than System 1
processing it can smooth out the first and hasty attempts made
by System 1. In the diction of dual system theorists, the analytic
mind is called up when encountering an impasse or conflict and
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 September 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1395
fpsyg-07-01395 September 13, 2016 Time: 12:42 # 9
Zander et al. Continuity and Discontinuity in Problem Solving
will attempt to deliberately solve the problem by applying certain
rational strategies. Importantly, Systems 1 and 2, or intuition and
insight, are here considered to be qualitatively different – “hare
and tortoise.”
Equally important, System 1 is considered subordinate to
System 2 and its hasty responses needs to be tamed (cf.
Kahneman, 2011, p. 185). Kahneman (2011, p. 44) states: “One
of the main functions of System 2 is to monitor and control
thought and actions “suggested” by System 1, allowing some to
be expressed directly in behavior and suppressing or modifying
others.” Given such an understanding of intuition and insight, the
discontinuity model may suffer from the very same conceptual
problem as a dual-system account of reasoning: that is, how
and by which factors is a conflict or impasse detected? “Who”
eventually launches restructuring processes that are needed to
overcome the error? How does restructuring of the first problem
representation take place? This may be viewed as a variation of
the “homunculus problem.”
Hence, within the discontinuity conception of insight,
intuition is not regarded as helpful or diagnostic for the
generation of a pending insight. In line with this idea, Metcalfe
and Wiebe (1987) investigated feeling of warmth accompanying
insight and incremental problem solving using classical insight
problems and algebraic problems. They used feeling-of-warmth
ratings as the assessment of how close participants intuitively felt
to the solution, which was taken to indicate the subjective nearness
to the solution. Interestingly, they found out that these subjective
feelings of warmth differed for insight and non-insight solutions
insofar that they could predict performance only on incremental
algebra problems. For insight problems such intuitive feelings
were lacking. Given this result, one may conclude that intuition
differs from insight concerning the (introspective) access to non-
conscious processing: whereas decision makers intuit the solution
to a problem, people solving the problem by insight show to lack
such hunches. Thus, additionally to the continuity/discontinuity
distinction, insightful solutions as in contrast to intuitive ones
seem to be discrete phenomena in terms of availability to
awareness. However, it could be also possible that the conscious
assessment of how close/far the solution is, just easier for non-
insight tasks. Since non-insight tasks are well-defined insofar that
there are clear starts, solution paths, and goals, which enables
exact planning of the necessary steps and its order (as for example
in algebraic problems). Conversely, classical insight problems
may be technically well-defined (in that there is also a clear start
and goal, see e.g., the famous nine-dot problem), but since the
problem’s different components are unhelpfully represented in
the problem solvers mental set, it is difficult or rather impossible
to estimate how far/close the solution is.
Interim Summary III
As an interim summary, it may be concluded that intuition
research advocates a continuity model, in which intuition and
insight build upon each other in a gradual and cumulative
fashion: people are non-consciously sensitized toward pattern
or meaning in the environment and act accordingly (e.g.,
Bowers et al., 1990). In contrast, insight research focuses on
a discontinuity model, in which the initial representation of
the problem (i.e., early intuition) biases later solution attempts
and has to be overcome in order to reach a solution. Here,
no intuitive precursors of insight in terms of a subjectively felt
nearness toward the solution are assumed. This latter model
resembles famous, yet recently heavily criticized, dual-system
models in judgment and decision-making research insofar as in
both approaches the participants first intuitive apprehension of a
problem biases its later solution.
SEMANTIC COHERENCE TASKS USED
IN INTUITION AND INSIGHT RESEARCH:
WORD TRIADS AND REMOTE
ASSOCIATES
Interestingly, in the semantic domain, intuition research
following Bowers et al. (1990) approach and contemporary
insight research do have used similar stimuli yet with different
task rationales, which could be used as an excellent starting point
for necessary, and up to now lacking, common investigations.
As described earlier in this contribution, in the tradition of
Bowers et al. (1990, 1995), typical coherence judgment tasks
include semantically coherent and incoherent word triads – a task
that dates back to the work of Mednick (1962). Here, response
patterns of both triad types (i.e., coherent vs. incoherent) are
compared to each other. In recent research on insight problem
solving, Bowden et al. (2005) presented a novel framework and a
new class of problems in order to probe insight problem solving.
The authors equate subjectively reported aha-experiences with
insight. The authors have used word triads based on Mednick’s
(1962) task to investigate the neuronal underpinnings of insight.
They presented a large number of problems that can be solved
either by insight or by non-insight (i.e., Aha! vs. Non-Aha!)
and do not require a lot of time to be solved (Kounios and
Beeman, 2014). As a result they found that Aha! solutions
revealed distinguish neural patterns than Non-Aha!-solutions.
Unlike intuition research, they (1) only applied word triads that
are principally solvable (i.e., no incoherent triads), and (2) word
triads that consist of compound remote associate.
Bowers et al. (1990), distinguished two types of triads and
termed them convergent and divergent triads, respectively. For
convergent triads the common associate means the same with
respect to each clue word, whereas for divergent triads the
common associate is more remote and changes its meaning
with respect to each clue word. An example for a coherent
convergent triad is SALT DEEP FOAM– SEA; and an example
for a divergent triad is AGE MILE SAND– STONE. Unlike
convergent triads, divergent triads are built in a way one need
to detect the multiple meanings of the solution word to associate
it with the meanings of the three clue words. As divergent triads
may require a restructuring of the different meanings of the clues
with respect to the solution, these kinds of triads could be nicely
seen as an insight condition.
According to Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2007), divergent
triads are not as complex as classical insight problems, but they
can nevertheless be used as a kind of insight problems. Like
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typical insight tasks (1) they misdirect retrieval processes (i.e.,
the first word of a divergent triad biases later thought toward a
specific, yet wrong direction), (2) the strategy that has led to the
correct solution cannot be reported by the problem solver, and
(3) aha-experiences can occur.
For such divergent triads, Cranford and Moss (2012), using
a verbal protocol method, found out that there are two
different types of insight problems, for which only one type
shows the typical traditional characteristics of an insight. It
has to be emphasized that, unlike Bowden et al. (2005),
the authors consider all three components, subjective aha-
experience, impasse, and restructuring, as necessary for an insight
to occur. They could show that some problems, consisting
of divergent triads, could be solved via immediate insight,
whereas others were solved by non-immediate or delayed insight.
Interestingly, only the latter type of insights showed the supposed
phases of insight. Fedor et al. (2015) detailed on this question
and found that the classical insight sequence (i.e., constrained
search, impasse, insight, extended search, and solution) is a
rather rare event. They found that participants showed much
more often fairly different insight sequences (i.e., a flexible
order of the different problem-solving stages), which has to be
further specified in the future. We consider this line of research
(Cranford and Moss, 2012; Kounios and Beeman, 2014; Fedor
et al., 2015) as promising and important for future endeavors,
which may initiate the common investigations of intuition and
insight.
CONCLUSION, OPEN RESEARCH
QUESTIONS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
To conclude, we set out to disentangle the underlying
mechanisms of intuition and insight so as to clarify their
relationship. At first sight, intuition and insight seem to be
very differently conceptualized: while the intuition literature
favors a continuity model, insight has been described within in
a discontinuity model. In a continuity model, early (semantic)
readout processes are taken as diagnostic for the non-conscious
detection of environmental patterns and/or meaning (in terms of
an antecedent of later explicit mental representation or insight).
Intuition is described as aiding decision making and problem
solving when time and cognitive capacity is limited and necessary
information is temporarily unavailable. Contrary to this, in
a discontinuity model early intuitive responses misdirect the
generation of a correct solution or are experimentally utilized
to bias solution attempts. In this case, intuitions lead people
astray. Instead of employing intuition, mental restructuring
processes (i.e., qualitative changes in the non-conscious search
processes) are needed to overcome biased intuitive impressions
or apprehensions so as to eventually solve the problem. In that
respect, a discontinuity model resembles dual-process accounts
in judgment and decision making.
Except early work by Bowers et al. (1990, 1995) and Dorfman
et al. (1996), there have not been much empirical investigations
so far aiming at exploring similarities and differences in the
underlying neurocognitive mechanisms of intuition and insight.
A major drawback here may be that there are no tasks that
easily enable a direct empirical comparison between the two
concepts. Nevertheless, we consider it very important to test
intuitive and insight solution processes by means of exactly the
same task and within the same participants. Such a task needs
to be created. With this theoretical contribution, we therefore
aim to initiate common investigations of both fields of research
to detect neurocognitive similarities and differences between
intuitive processing and insight problem solving. A good starting
point for common empirical investigations may be the use of
different types of triads [as for example divergent and convergent
triads, as formerly suggested by Bowers et al. (1990)] in order
to induce gradual and discontinuous solution attempts. We
also consider it important to investigate not only the cognitive
processes that may underlie intuition and insight, but also the
neuronal processes involved. Future studies may shed light on
the specific (and maybe distinct) neuronal correlates, which
will then also allow drawing conclusions about the theoretical
conceptualization of the two phenomena. Interesting research
questions would be (as non-exhaustive list): (1) Are the neuronal
correlates different for the two types of triads (convergent
versus divergent triads)? (2) Do aha-experiences also occur for
convergent triads? (3) Do feelings-of-warmth ratings occur for
both types of triads or only for convergent triads? (4) Do verbal
protocols differ for the two types of triads? (5) How can the
assumed recursive coherence building process be neuronally
mapped? The further investigation of the underlying cognitive
and neuronal processes of restructuring may also deeply progress
our understanding of the topic. Here, Öllinger et al. (2006, 2013)
reached influential results that may be carried forward in future
research. Equally important, following Kounios and Beeman
(2014) in using current neuroimaging techniques may promote
the detection of objective physiological markers of insight (in
form of a specific neuronal or electrophysiological activation
pattern accompanying the experience of impasses and aha’s
as well as correlating mental restructuring processes). Kounios
and Beeman (2014) as well as Sandkühler and Bhattacharya
(2008) already gained promising results in this respect, thus
their research may be a good starting point for the future. To
sum up, intuition and insight are intriguing (non-analytical)
mental phenomena that need to be further investigated in the
future.
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